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ABSTRACT: The aim of this paper is to trace the development of Epicurean epistemology 
from the death of Epicurus in 270 BCE to the latter part of the first century BCE. The story 
gains interest from the fact that these Epicureans were, as would be expected, scrupulously 
loyal to the doctrines of their founder as they interpreted these, but at the same time found 
themselves obliged to elaborate and strengthen the inferential methodology he had 
bequeathed, initially in order to resist the sceptical critiques of the New Academy, and later 
in order to justify their school’s empiricism in opposition to the rationalistic Stoic theory of 
inferential validity. The protagonists are Colotes, Polystratus, Timasagoras, Zeno of Sidon, 
Philodemus and Lucretius, with Cicero an important witness.  
SOMMARIO: Lo scopo di questo articolo è quello di tratteggiare lo sviluppo dell’epistemologia 
epicurea dalla morte di Epicuro nel 270 a.C. fino alla seconda metà del I sec. a.C. Questa 
vicenda desta particolare interesse per il fatto che gli Epicurei di quest’epoca erano 
scrupolosamente fedeli alle dottrine del fondatore secondo le interpretazioni che fornivano 
di queste (il che non stupisce), ma allo stesso tempo erano costretti a elaborare e a rafforzare 
la metodologia inferenziale che Epicuro aveva lasciato loro in eredità, in un primo momento 
per opporsi alle critiche scettiche della Nuova Academia e successivamente per legittimare 
l’empirismo della loro scuola in opposizione alla teoria stoica della validità inferenziale. I 
protagonisti sono Colote, Polistrato, Timasagora, Zenone di Sidone, Filodemo e Lucrezio, 
con Cicerone come importante testimone. 
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1. The founder’s authority 
To draw a firm line between the epistemology of Epicurus (see Verde’s 
article above) and that of his Epicurean successors is a hazardous task. The 
school founder died in 270 BCE, to be succeeded as school-head by 
Hermarchus, who thereby became the leader among an early group of 
leading Epicureans whose work on the system continued after the founder’s 
death.1  
The significance of that fact lies in the changed attitude to the founder 
that typically occurred at this juncture in a school’s history. The Epicurean 
school in time became famous for the reverence with which it treated the 
authority of its four founders, above all Epicurus himself. But it is, as in the 
Academy and Stoa, hard to discern that kind of unquestioning allegiance 
during its founder’s lifetime. There is in fact evidence of at least limited 
disagreements between Epicurus and some leading members of his circle, 
quite apart from the likelihood that at this date some philosophical issues 
will have remained as yet unsettled, or even unaddressed, in the school’s 
inner circle. But following the founder’s death the very nature of school 
loyalty dictated that his written doctrines would henceforth be canonical – 
as were, in the absence of Epicurus’ own explicit pronouncements on this or 
that issue, those of his three co-founders – Metrodorus, Hermarchus and 
Polyaenus, on the somewhat idealistic assumption that unanimity had 
reigned from the start.  
In reality, subsequent generations of Epicureans made many 
innovations, sometimes merely extending Epicurean theory into new areas, 
                                                                          
1 From Hermarchus himself we possess the longest preserved continuous passage 
from any early Epicurean apart from Epicurus himself, transcribed by Porphyry, Abst., I, 7-
12 = Hermarch. Fr. 34 in F. Longo Auricchio, Ermarco, frammenti, Naples, Bibliopolis, 
1988. Although its topic is anthropological, it may afford us our first opportunity to see 
Epicurean epistemological concepts at work among Epicurus’ immediate successors. 
Notably, the much-debated Epicurean term ἐπιλογισμός appears to be given a more precise 
technical function than in Epicurus’ own writings, as the third level in a scale of learning: 
(1) irrational perception unsupported by memory, (2) irrational perception supported by 
memory, (3) rational observation. The work from which the passage is thought to come, 
Hermarchus’ Against Empedocles, has been assigned a very early date (see Longo 
Auricchio, Ermarco, frammenti, p. 126-127), but the evidence for this has now receded 
owing to Obbink’s improved text of Philodemus, Piet., XIX, 23-30 (Fr. 29 Longo 
Auricchio = lines 541-548 in D. Obbink, Philodemus On Piety, Part 1, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1996), and there is no reason in principle why it might not be dated late 
enough to belong to Hermarchus’ own scholarchate. 
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but sometimes risking the charge of being in conflict with Epicurus’ own 
explicit views. In the latter kind of case, no Epicurean would ever have 
considered expressing this or that innovation as a disagreement with the now-
divinized founder, any more than a Platonist would have done in respect of 
Plato. Rather, the terms of debate among Epicureans were primarily 
exegetical: the school’s founders must be shown, when properly interpreted, to 
have in fact endorsed the apparently innovative view, or at any rate not to 
have contradicted it. This authorization procedure by appeal to the school’s 
scriptures could involve rejecting as inauthentic some of the early writings 
attributed to one or other of the founders, or checking and collating 
manuscripts in order to find, if necessary by emendation, a reading that 
would restore the founders’ consistency or credibility.2 
In these and similar ways, disputes among the Epicureans came to rest in 
part on close study of the foundational texts, with the aim of refining the 
literary canon and being able to invoke its authority in doctrinal disputes. 
Thus during the period covered by the present article, members and 
followers of the Athenian Garden found themselves more than once in 
conflict with the very independent Epicurean community at Rhodes, each 
group invoking Epicurean scripture in its own support and each ready to 
condemn the other as unfaithful to the canonical teachings.3 For this reason 
I avoid as potentially misleading the common practice of referring to one or 
the other party in such a dispute as ‘dissident’ Epicureans. All Epicureans 
considered themselves loyalists.4 
One of the Athens-Rhodes disputes involved the Rhodian Epicurean 
Timasagoras, ca. 200 BCE. The specifically epistemological topics on which 
he is reported to have taken a distinctive stance included his innovative thesis 
on the nature of the simulacra that enable vision and imagination.5 Rather 
                                                                          
2 See especially the text-critical work of Demetrius of Laconia in PHerc. 1012: E. 
Puglia, Demetrio Lacone, Aporie testuali ed esegetiche in Epicuro, Naples, Bibliopolis, 1988. 
3 See further, D. N. Sedley, “Philosophical Allegiance in the Greco-Roman World”, 
in M. Griffin-J. Barnes (eds.), Philosophia Togata I: Essays on Philosophy and Roman 
Society, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989, p. 97-119. 
4 All that ‘dissidence’ could mean is disagreement with the current head of the 
Athenian school, but it does not seem that the scholarch’s pronouncements on doctrinal 
matters were treated as having any sort of quasi-papal authority, cf. Sedley, “Philosophical 
Allegiance in the Greco-Roman World”, p. 112-113. 
5 For the evidence, and helpful discussion of it, including the correction of 
‘Timagoras’ to ‘Timasagoras’, see F. Verde, “Ancora su Timasagora epicureo”, Elenchos, 31, 
2010, p. 285-317. 
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than a series of discrete films travelling from the surface of the object to the 
eye, he held them to be continuous atomic streams or ‘effluences’ 
(ἀπόρροιαι) which, we must nevertheless infer, were such as to preserve and 
transmit the external structure of the object seen. Although Aetius (Plac., 
IV, 13, 6), our single source, reports this as a significant ‘re-branding’ of the 
school’s position, there is no reason to doubt that, following the normal 
school principles, Timasagoras cited textual authority from the founder. 
For Epicurus does indeed, even in his surviving epitome the Letter to 
Herodotus (46), allow ‘effluences’ as one of three alternative forms that 
simulacra might take. Why contrary to the mainstream school doctrine 
Timasagoras opted for this alternative is unknown, but one can easily 
imagine at least two motives: (1) to answer challenges as to how the 
simulacra of large objects can shrink drastically enough to enter the eye or 
the mind, yet retain their original shape; (2) to enable the Epicurean 
doctrine of vision to become a credible competitor to the mathematical science 
of optics, with which it was difficult for the simulacra theory, as traditionally 
understood, to compete.6 Another of Timasagoras’ interventions will be 
considered below. 
2. Resistance to scepticism 
The most obvious driver of new developments in the school was the need 
to fend off external critics and competitors. An epistemological rivalry with 
the Stoics is an example to which we will turn in due course, but the major 
concern in the generation or two immediately following Epicurus’ death in 
270 seems to have been the challenge posed by the revival of scepticism. 
During the 260s BC Arcesilaus succeeded to the headship of the 
Academy, and under his influence the formerly doctrinal Platonist school 
veered away from dogma, instead adopting towards rival schools an 
essentially critical, dialectical stance. It seems to have been during that early 
phase of the sceptical New Academy that Colotes, who had been an 
intimate of Epicurus, wrote his treatise entitled The impossibility of life itself 
according to other philosophers (meaning, of course, other than Epicurus), 
about whose content we learn from Plutarch’s polemical counterblast in his 
                                                                          
6 There has been a long-running debate about the Epicureans’ critical stance towards 
conventional mathematics. See most recently R. Netz, “Were there Epicurean 
Mathematicians?”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 49, 2015, p. 283-319; and F. 
Verde, “Ancora sulla matematica epicurea”, Cronache Ercolanesi, 46, 2016, p. 21-37. 
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own Against Colotes. None of Colotes’ chosen targets – Democritus, 
Parmenides, Empedocles, Socrates, Melissus, Plato, Stilpo, the Cyrenaics and 
Arcesilaus – were criticised for their ethical positions, as one might have 
predicted, but entirely for the support that their epistemology and 
metaphysics allegedly lent to scepticism, and specifically, to scepticism about 
human cognitive access to physical reality.7 The last target attacked by 
Colotes, though anonymous, is unerringly recognized by Plutarch as the 
New Academy of Arcesilaus, presented as advocating universal suspension of 
judgement (ἐποχή). Yet, intriguingly, there is reason to think that the treatise 
was composed, not in the vicinity of the Athenian Academy, but in 
Alexandria. This much is suggested by its opening dedication to Ptolemy II 
(Plutarch., Adv. Col., 1107E), and by a flattering peroration in which the 
Alexandrian king was warned against the dangers to law and order posed by 
the ruinous non-Epicurean philosophies listed (1124C). We should infer 
that the felt need for Epicureans to counterattack Academic scepticism was 
not just an Athenian preoccupation but was spreading to the courts of major 
Hellenized cultural centres, where the patronage of the local dynasty might 
well be hotly competed for. 
A philosophically more sophisticated case involves the third Epicurean 
scholarch, Polystratus, presumably writing in the middle part of the third 
century BCE. There is every reason to identify his opponents too as the 
sceptically inclined philosophers who had in the last generation or so, under 
the leadership of Arcesilaus, taken over the Academy. Here is a substantially 
preserved passage from the papyrus of his treatise On irrational contempt, 
more fully entitled Against those who irrationally despise popular beliefs:8 
Or do you think, on the basis of the foregoing argument, that someone would not 
suffer the troubles which I mention but rather would make it convincing that fair, 
                                                                          
7 The meagre papyrus fragments of Colotes’ Against Plato’s Lysis (PHerc. 208 
likewise contain several occurrences of epistemological terminology, notably δοξαζόμενον 
and forms of ἐναργ-, despite the targeted dialogue itself scarcely being epistemological in 
content; and the even scantier fragments of his Against Plato’s Euthydemus (PHerc. 1032) 
seem inter alia to target Socrates’ equation of wisdom with luck at Euthyd., 279d. For a 
judicious survey of these fragments, see E. Kechagia, Plutarch against Colotes: A Lesson in 
History of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, Ch. 3. For the Alexandrian 
context of Colotes’ treatise, discussed below, see also K. Fleischer, Dionysios von 
Alexandria, De natura (περὶ φύσεως): Übersetzung, Kommentar und Wu ̈rdigung, Mit einer 
Einleitung zur Geschichte des Epikureismus in Alexandria, Turnhout, Brepols, 2016, Ch. 1. 
8 Ed. G. Indelli, Polistrato, Sul disprezzo irrazionale delle opinioni popolari, Naples, 
Bibliopolis, 1978. 
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foul and all other matters of belief are falsely believed in, just because unlike gold and 
similar things they are not the same everywhere? After all, it must stare everybody in 
the face that bigger and smaller are also not perceived the same everywhere and in 
relation to all magnitudes […] So too with heavier and lighter. And the same applies 
also to other powers, without exception. For neither are the same things healthy for 
everybody, nor nourishing or fatal, nor the opposites of these, but the very same 
things are healthy and nourishing for some yet have the opposite effect on others. 
Therefore either they must say that these too are false – things whose effects are 
plain for everyone to see – or else they must refuse to brazen it out and to battle 
against what is evident, and not abolish fair and foul as falsely believed in either, just 
because unlike stone and gold they are not the same for everybody […] Relative 
predicates do not have the same status as things said not relatively but in accordance 
with something’s own nature. Nor does the one kind truly exist but the other not. So 
to expect them to have the same attributes, or the one kind to exist but the other 
not, is naive. And there is no difference between starting from these and eliminating 
those and starting from those and eliminating these: it would be similarly naive to 
think that since the bigger and heavier and whiter and sweeter are bigger than one 
thing but smaller than another, and heavier, and likewise with the other attributes, 
and since nothing has the same one of these attributes per se as it has in relation to 
something else, in the same way stone, gold and the like ought also, if they truly 
existed, likewise to be gold in relation to one person while having the opposite 
nature in relation to another; and to say that, since that is not the case, these things 
are falsely believed in and do not really exist (On irrational contempt, XXIII, 26-
XXVI, 23).9 
The opponents can be seen to draw heavily on Platonic dialectical materials 
in order to launch their attack on the reality of values, in particular in their 
contrast between the universally agreed determinate nature exhibited by 
minerals and the cultural relativity of values. As one might expect of the 
New Academy, this sceptical argument borrows its materials freely from 
the text of Plato (Phaedrus, 263a, cf. also Euthyphro, 7b-d, Theaetetus, 
172b). More remarkable is how Polystratus, in his reply, appears himself to 
draw inspiration from Plato – a strategy with all the more ad hominem 
force when directed against Plato’s own self-declared successors. Plato had 
indeed never intended by this contrast between minerals and values to 
impugn the reality of the latter, any more than he had meant to infer from 
the relativity of large(r) and small(er) to their unreality. On the contrary, at 
Sophist 255c he had presented an exhaustive division of beings (ὄντα) into 
absolute and relative, a bicategorial scheme which became formal Academic 
doctrine under his second successor Xenocrates (F15 Isnardi Parente2). 
Much the same stance as Plato’s own is developed by Polystratus as a 
                                                                          
9 All translations are my own. 
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rebuttal of the contemporary Academy. He resourcefully points out that 
the mere existence of an ontological difference between the two categories 
does not entail that one or other of them will fall short of reality. Anyone 
who thinks otherwise, he ingeniously adds, could as easily argue that, since 
such relative predicates as beneficial and harmful manifestly are part of the 
structure of reality, it must be the non-relative items such as minerals that 
are unreal! 
A further attempted innovation likely to have been motivated by the 
challenge of Academic scepticism is attributable to the Rhodian Epicurean 
Timasagoras. We have already encountered one of his two recorded 
innovations to the school’s doctrine of vision. The other, noted by Cicero 
(Lucullus, 80) in his defence of the New Academy’s scepticism, concerns 
the case of seeing double. To judge from the Ciceronian context, the 
debate ran more or less as follows.  
1) Epicurus insists on the truth of all sense-perceptions. If a single case 
of a false sense-perception were found, trust in the senses would 
collapse. But in fact the eye simply registers with unfailing accuracy 
the visual data reaching it. In all alleged cases of optical illusion the 
error lies in the mind’s misinterpretation or over-interpretation of 
those visual data.  
2) Critics from the New Academy respond with the counterexample 
of an eye squeezed out of shape and as a result falsely seeing the 
single flame in a lamp as two flames. Here what appear to the eye 
are the visual data, but not in the form in which they first reached 
it. How can the Epicureans say that the appearance is ‘true’, when 
it is not even true to those visual data? 
3) Timasagoras replies on behalf of the Epicureans that never, when 
he has squeezed his eye while looking at a lamp, have there 
appeared to him to be two flames. This supports the Epicurean 
thesis that falsehood is always located in the added opinion, not in 
the eyes themselves. 
In stage (3), does Timasagoras mean (a) that in the situation described the 
bare visual appearance has never even momentarily looked to him like two 
flames? Or (b) that he has never been misled into thinking that there 
actually were two flames? Cicero seems to understand the latter. But on 
either understanding Timasagoras’ reply would be meant to disqualify the 
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Academic example from counting as a genuine optical illusion at all, and 
thereby to block it from being used as the single counterexample that Epicurus 
in stage (1) conceded would suffice to destroy his most fundamental 
epistemological doctrine. 
3. The first century BCE 
It is appropriate now to move our focus to the end of the period covered by 
this article, partly because it is an age when new polemical confrontations were 
dominating the epistemological agenda, and partly because the greater part of 
the evidence for developments within the Epicurean epistemological tradition 
is supplied by what one might call ‘Italian’ sources datable to the middle 
decades of the first century BC. This was an era in which Epicureanism was 
establishing a strong foothold in Italy, both in the primarily Greek-speaking 
south and, to a surprising extent, at Rome itself. Prominent Roman 
Epicureans of the period included Cicero’s close friend Atticus, and Cassius 
the co-assassin of Julius Caesar. Cassius, not unlike Timasagoras, seems to have 
taken a special interest in the interpretation of the Epicurean theory of 
simulacra, notably with regard to its role in the mechanism of imagination.10 
In the mid 50s Lucretius set out, in his great poem De rerum natura, to 
showcase Epicurus’ physics in Latin verse. Around a decade later, in 45-44 
BCE, Cicero wrote a series of philosophical dialogues, which included 
extended Latin presentations of Epicurean theology (De natura deorum, I) and 
ethics (De finibus, I-II). Understandably, these works are much concerned 
with finding the most appropriate ways to capture Epicurean terminology in 
Latin. And that particular preoccupation is one important symptom of an era 
in which the school’s philosophy was adapting itself to its new home in the 
Roman world.  
This consideration finally brings us to Philodemus. Born at Gadara in 
Syria, and originally trained in the Epicurean school’s Athenian headquarters, 
during the central decades of the first century BCE Philodemus taught in the 
Campania region of southern Italy, where like many Greek philosophers he 
enjoyed the patronage of a wealthy Roman. In his case this was Lucius 
Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus, consul of 58 BCE and also, as it happened, the 
father-in-law of Julius Caesar. Although Philodemus’ own teaching was 
undoubtedly done in Greek, he had the ear of some leading Roman 
                                                                          
10 See the discussion of this issue between Cicero and Cassius in Cic., Fam., XV, 16 
and 19, and Plutarch., Brut., 37. 
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intellectuals, including Cicero (see Fin., II, 119) as well as the young Virgil 
and Horace. The discovery at Herculaneum, by 18th-century excavators, of 
Philodemus’ personal philosophical library, sadly damaged though the scrolls 
are, has massively enriched the historical study of Epicureanism. In the final 
section of this chapter we will turn in particular to Philodemus’ 
epistemological treatise On sign-inferences. 
A note of caution has first to be added about Lucretius. Much of what we 
know – or think we know – about Epicurus’ own physics and epistemology is 
in fact drawn from Lucretius’ poem, which is far fuller and more detailed (if 
less technical) than anything that now survives from Epicurus’ own pen. A 
natural working hypothesis is that Lucretius is to the best of his ability 
following Epicurus’ text faithfully, as indeed he declares himself to be doing 
(DRN, III, 1-13), and not relying on intermediate sources in the way that 
Cicero, for one, certainly does. But if this hypothesis were wrong, and some 
Lucretian passages in fact represented developments postdating Epicurus, it 
would in most cases be hard to identify which passages those were. I myself in 
fact favour the view that Lucretius was working directly from Epicurus’ major 
treatise On nature, without taking account of more recent developments in the 
school,11 but that remains controversial. The only parts of his On the nature of 
things which are uncontroversially Lucretius’ own original contributions are 
the proems to each of the six books, and so far as possible I shall limit my use of 
his evidence to those passages.12 
4. A fourth criterion of truth? 
Epicurus, in the Kanon (‘Yardstick’), says that sense-perceptions (aistheseis), 
preconceptions (prolepseis) and feelings (pathe) are the criteria of truth. The 
Epicureans add ‘representational projections of thought’ (phantastikai epibolai tes 
dianoias) (Diog. Laert., VP, X, 31).  
Here we have something of a rarity in the Epicurean record: explicit 
evidence of a doctrinal innovation on the part of Epicurus’ followers. It 
presumably postdates his death in 270 BCE, and thus falls into the phase 
covered by the present article.  
                                                                          
11 D. N. Sedley, Lucretius and the Transformation of Greek Wisdom, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1998, Ch. 3. 
12 Anyone wishing to consider Lucretius’ epistemology in its own right should start 
by reading De rerum natura, IV, 26-1036. 
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The first three criteria listed in this passage – sense-perceptions 
(aistheseis), preconceptions (prolepseis) and feelings (pathe) – are commonplace 
both in Epicurus’ own writings and in those of subsequent Epicurean 
generations. Curiously, however, the fourth item listed, phantastikai epibolai 
tes dianoias, is likewise at least twice appealed to by Epicurus (Hrdt., 38, RS, 
XXIV) as if it were another of his criteria of truth. We may therefore take the 
school’s reported innovation to consist in nothing more than making its 
criterial status explicit. It is unknown why Epicurus did not himself formally 
do so in the Kanon, his now lost work on the criteria of truth. It was a work of 
(in at least two senses!) canonical status, upon which the school reverentially 
bestowed the extravagant-sounding epithet ‘heaven-sent’ (Cic., ND, I, 43, 
Plutarch., Adv. Col., 1118Α). Hence, it seems, even a small departure from it 
had to be acknowledged and, no doubt, justified. 
Be that as it may, it seems that one credible motive for the elevation of 
phantastikai epibolai tes dianoias to official criterial status by Epicurus’ 
followers was that the expression was felt by them to capture, better than any 
other, the nature of Epicurus’ own greatest cognitive gift to mankind. As 
Cicero’s Epicurean spokesman Velleius explains, Epicurus’ godlike superiority 
lay above all in his powers of intellectual vision: 
For the same man who taught us everything else taught us also that the world was made 
by nature without the need for craftsmanship, and that this thing which you call 
impossible without divine creativity is in fact so easy that nature will make, is making and 
has made infinitely many worlds. Just because you [the Stoic Balbus] do not see how 
nature can do this without a mind, unable to develop your plot’s dénouement you copy 
the tragic poets and resort to a god. You would not be demanding this god’s handiwork if 
you saw the measureless magnitude of space, endless in all directions, into which the 
mind, projecting and concentrating itself (in quam se iniciens animus et intendens), travels 
far and wide, seeing as a result no boundary of its extremities at which it could call a halt. 
In this measureless stretch of widths, lengths and heights there flies an infinite mass of 
countless atoms, which despite the presence of void between them stick together and by 
taking hold of each other form a continuous whole. And from these are made those 
shapes and formations of things which you think are impossible without bellows and 
anvil. With this thought you have placed as a yoke upon our necks a permanent overlord, 
for us to fear day and night […] Freed from these terrors by Epicurus, and delivered into 
freedom, we do not fear those whom we understand neither to bring trouble upon 
themselves nor to try and make trouble for others, and with holy reverence we worship 
their supremely fine nature (ND, I, 53-54, 56).  
Velleius thus brings out what Epicureans can achieve for themselves if they 
follow Epicurus on his odyssey of the mind, and thus come to appreciate the 
inevitability that mere atomic accident, operating as it must do on an infinite 
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scale, will produce worlds like our own, without the need for divine 
craftsmanship. That in its turn requires them to see, by mental projection, 
what the universe’s infinity really means. 
A decade or so before Cicero wrote this, Lucretius had eulogised Epicurus 
in similar terms (I, 62-79) as the pioneering Greek thinker who burst through 
the visual barrier presented by the outermost heaven – the ‘flaming walls of the 
world’ – to travel in thought through boundless space and discover the scope 
and limits of physical possibility. Lucretius goes on (III, 14-30) to describe how 
he has himself been enabled by Epicurus’ lesson to make the same mental 
breakthrough, and to enjoy the intense pleasure of seeing the world as entirely 
unthreatening. The Epicurean thought experiments, arguments and mental 
exercises by which this vision can be achieved are set out at length by Lucretius 
towards the end of his first book (I, 951-1051). For example, we are invited to 
imagine going to some hypothetical boundary of the universe and throwing a 
spear past it (I, 968-983).13 
Velleius, in speaking of the mind ‘projecting itself’, se iniciens, into infinite 
space, is capturing in Latin Epicurus’ technical term, epibole tes dianoias. A 
possible subtext underlying Velleius’ words is that the method of discovery 
which Epicurus pioneered was one which he thereby earned the privilege of 
naming. At any rate, elsewhere Velleius makes a similar claim about the term 
prolepsis (ND, I, 43-44): Epicurus was uniquely able to explain the universal 
human ‘preconception’ of god, having himself discovered and named this basic 
criterion of truth.14 
5. Sign-inferences 
Arguably the most important contribution to the history of philosophy to 
emerge from the wreckage of Philodemus’ library is to be found in his own 
                                                                          
13 Similarly at II, 1044-1047, in introducing his argument that beyond our own 
world there are countless others, Lucretius writes “For given the infinite amount of space 
beyond these walls of our world, the mind demands an account of what further things lie 
there for the intellect to aim to reach with its gaze, and to which the mind’s projection 
[animi iactus, cf. II, 740, 1080] can free itself and fly.” There seems to be a close 
conceptual correspondence between the mind’s self-projection and its imagined throwing 
of the spear. 
14 For the wide-ranging use of prolepsis in Philodemus, see V. Tsouna, “Philodemus 
and the Epicurean Tradition”, in A. M. Ioppolo-D. N. Sedley (eds.), Pyrrhonists, 
Patricians, Platonizers: Hellenistic Philosophy in the Period 155-86 BC, Tenth Symposium 
Hellenisticum, Naples, Bibliopolis, 2007, p. 339-397. 
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treatise On sign-inferences.15 Seemingly intended for school use rather than 
for publication, it is his record of an otherwise quite unknown debate 
about scientific method that is likely to have taken place around the 
beginning of the 1st century BC, in Athens. In it Philodemus summarizes 
(down to XXVII, 28), both from his own lecture notes and from those of 
his fellow-student Bromius, how their teacher Zeno of Sidon, and likewise 
the eminent contemporary Epicurean Demetrius of Laconia (XXVIII, 13-
XXIX, 16), had defended their own shared theory of scientific inference 
against opponents who denied its validity. This favoured Epicurean 
method is the ‘similarity method’ (ὁ καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα τρόπος), while the 
opponents advocate instead the deductive ‘elimination method’ (ὁ κατ᾽ 
ἀνασκευὴν τρόπος, or just ἀνασκευή, ‘elimination’, for short). These 
opponents are almost certainly Stoics. If in the early years of the first 
century BCE it is the epistemological challenge posed by another doctrinal 
school, rather than the rapidly weakening scepticism of the New 
Academy,16 that now occupies the Epicureans’ main attention, that is very 
much a sign of the times. 
The similarity method is itself subdivided into two species. The first is 
based on direct similarity, as is well exemplified (though not exhausted) by 
inductive inference, the standard example being inference from the 
exceptionless mortality of human beings in our experience to the universal 
mortality of all human beings, including those outside our experience. The 
second species is based on analogical rather than direct similarity, the 
analogy normally taking the form of an inference from the macroscopic to 
                                                                          
15 The title seems to have been Περὶ < > καὶ σημειώσεων, it being uncertain what the 
missing word was. At all events the surviving final part is focused on σημειώσεις, ‘sign-
inferences’. 
16 However, for an attempt to identify the opponents as New Academics see E. 
Asmis, “Epicurean Semiotics”, in G. Manetti (ed.), Knowledge through Signs, Brussels, 
Brepols, 1996, p. 155-185. For general studies of the treatise see, in addition to Asmis, 
above all P. and E. De Lacy, Philodemus, On Methods of Inference, Naples, Bibliopolis, 
1978; also J. Allen, Inference from Signs: Ancient Debates about the Nature of Evidence, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001; J. Barnes, “Epicurean Signs”, in J. Annas-R. H. 
Grimm (eds.), Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary Volume, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1988, p. 91-134; A. A. Long, “Reply to Jonathan Barnes, 
‘Epicurean Signs’”, in Annas-Grimm, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, p. 135-144; 
and G. Manetti, “La semiotica salvata(si) dal Vesuvio: Il dibattito tra Epicurei e Stoici (?) 
sull’inferenza da segni nel de signis di Filodemo”, Blityri, 1, 2012, p. 135-178. Currently 
the most accurate translation available is in D. Delattre-J. Pigeaud (eds.), Les Épicuriens, 
Paris, Gallimard, 2010, p. 535-562. 
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the microscopic. For instance, since macroscopic motion depends on empty 
space, motion at the microscopic level of atoms also does so. Both species of 
the method constitute Epicurean procedures for the use of ‘signs’ – that is, 
for the scientific discovery of unobserved truths by inference from the 
directly observable evidence. 
It should be clear that the analogical use of the method formally encodes 
what had always been, at least in outline, a primary Epicurean procedure for 
investigating the unobservable realm of atoms and void. The stock example 
noted above, the inference from motion to void, corresponds to the very first 
inference of the physics we meet in Epicurus’ epitome the Letter to 
Herodotus (40). It is less immediately obvious why the inductive use of the 
method should be equally important to Epicureans, but the following is a 
likely motive. In Cicero’s De natura deorum the account of Epicurean 
theology, probably itself derived from a work by Zeno of Sidon, includes a 
consensus omnium argument for the existence of gods (I, 43), starting from 
the premise that all human races have the prolepsis of gods. Whether this 
argument was already used by Epicurus himself can be disputed, but its use in 
the school by the time Philodemus studied there should not be in doubt. To 
defend the soundness of its main premise, that all human races have a 
prolepsis of gods, would have required arguing, by appeal to the similarity 
method, from the attested religious conceptions of known races to the 
unattested religious conceptions attributable to unknown races. This may 
well be among the contexts in which the inductive version of the ‘similarity 
method’ was first fully formulated and defended. 
It seems likely, in addition, that its formulation and defence were a 
response to the Stoic critics. This is because the critics, as reported by 
Philodemus, deny the formal validity of such ‘similarity’ inferences – thus 
incidentally anticipating the Humean problem of induction – and insist 
instead that the only valid inferences from observed sign to unobserved 
significate are those that respect the ‘elimination’ criterion: that if the 
significate is ‘eliminated’, i.e. taken to be false (in the case of a proposition) or 
non-existent (in the case of a state of affairs), then the sign is, simply thereby, 
‘co-eliminated’. And this seems to be an adaptation to sign-inferences of the 
favoured Stoic criterion of conditional entailment known as synartesis: that 
the negation of the consequent in a conditional should ‘conflict’ with the 
antecedent. In the terminology of this debate, signs differ from conditionals 
only to the extent that their standard formulation, instead of the conditional 
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‘If p, q’, is ‘Since p, q’, the latter being what Stoics would call a 
‘paraconditional’ (παρασυνημμένον), equivalent to ‘If p, q; and p’. 
Remarkably, the Epicurean side in the debate seems fully prepared to 
accept this fundamentally a priori ‘elimination’ criterion as correct, and to 
retain it alongside the ‘similarity’ criterion rejected by the Stoics. The 
Epicurean strategy is not to reject the Stoic inferential criterion but to 
minimize its role in sign-inference. The Stoic quest for a purely deductive 
scientific method is doomed to failure, they allege, since even the a priori 
elimination method cannot avoid relying on premises established by the 
empirical similarity method.  
True, the Epicureans say, the sign-inference “Since there is motion there 
is void” goes through trivially by the elimination method, because according 
to them if void is eliminated, motion is thereby co-eliminated. But that 
natural and universal generalization about motion is one that we have learnt 
in the first place by empirical generalization over a vast range of experiences, 
where without exception motion is observed to take place only where there is 
room for it to do so. 
This Epicurean strategy exhibits the empiricism that had always been 
the school’s epistemological hallmark, and which is here taken to underwrite 
all necessary truths: even apparently a priori truths are in reality 
generalizations from experience. Thus the same inductive methodology is 
pushed even into the realm of mathematics: from the fact that every 4x4 
square in our world has an area numerically equal to its perimeter, we may 
correctly infer that the same is true of 4x4 squares in all other worlds too 
(Philodemus, On sign-inferences, XV, 28-XVI, 1).  
If induction sounds like a bizarre way to establish the facts of 
mathematics, it should seem less so when we note that its key criterion is that 
of inconceivability. The basic format of a similarity inference is “Since x is F, 
y is F”, the justification being that y is so similar to x in nature as to make it 
inconceivable that y should lack an essential predicate of x. Thus it is 
‘inconceivable’ (XV, 37-38) that, while all 4x4 squares in our world have a 
certain property, 4x4 squares in other worlds should lack that property. To 
generalize, if two or more things are sufficiently similar in their nature, it is 
inconceivable that they should differ in some essential property. And this 
applies without distinction to mathematical and to (for instance) biological 
generalizations:  
[...] for instance, “If Plato is a man, Socrates is a man too.” For given that this is true, 
“If Socrates is not a man, Plato is not a man either” comes out true as well, not 
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because by the elimination of Socrates Plato is co-eliminated, but because it is 
impossible to conceive of Socrates not being a man but Plato being a man. And that 
belongs to the similarity method (On sign-inferences, XII, 19-31).  
The ultimate justification for this approach seems to lie in an Epicurean 
brand of essentialism, expressed by what we may call the ‘qua operator’, 
which is captured in Philodemus’ Greek by a range of subtly different terms 
translatable as ‘in so far as’, ‘in that’, etc.: 
Those who attack sign-inference by similarity do not notice the difference between 
the aforementioned [senses of ‘in so far as’ etc.], and how we establish the ‘in so far 
as’ premise, such as, for instance, that man in so far as he is man is mortal. [...] For we 
establish the necessary connection of one thing with another thing from the very fact 
that it has been an observed concomitant of all the instances which we have 
encountered, especially as we have met a variety of animals belonging to the same 
type which while differing from each other in all other respects all share such-and-
such common characteristics. Thus we say that man, in so far as and in that he is 
man, is mortal, because we have encountered a wide variety of men without ever finding any 
variation in this respect, or anything that draws us towards the opposite view. So this 
is the method on which the establishment of the premise rests, both for this issue 
and for the others in which we apply the ‘in so far as’ and ‘in that’ construction – the 
peculiar connection being indicated by the fact that the one thing is the inseparable 
and necessary concomitant of the other.                                                                                           
The same is not true in the case of what is established merely by the elimination of a 
sign. But even in these cases, it is the fact that all the instances which we have 
encountered have this as their concomitant that does the job of confirmation. For it 
is from the fact that all familiar moving objects, while having other differences, have 
it in common that their motion is through empty spaces, that we conclude the same 
to be without exception true also at the microscopic level. And our reason for 
contending that if there is not, or has not been, fire, smoke should be eliminated, is 
that smoke has been seen in all cases without exception to be a secretion from fire 
(On sign-inferences, XXXIV, 29-XXXVI, 7).  
 
In case it should be suspected that Epicurus’ own favoured inferential 
principle, appeal to the ‘lack of counterevidence’ (οὐκ ἀντιμαρτύρησις), has 
simply been replaced by this newly evolved methodology, we should note 
that it retains a significant role, not only in the above passage, but also in its 
immediate sequel: 
Another error which they make is in not noticing our procedure of establishing that 
no obstacle arises through things evident. For the existence of chance and of that 
which depends on us is not sufficient ground for accepting the minimal swerves of 
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atoms: it is necessary to show in addition that nothing else self-evident conflicts with 
the thesis17 (On sign-inferences, XXXVI, 7-17).  
Here, two centuries after his formulation of it, Epicurus’ own scientific 
methodology is visibly being honoured and maintained by his successors in 
the school he founded. True, the pressure to compete in current far more 
sophisticated debates about the justification of scientific inference has 
unmistakeably relegated that original methodology to a subordinate role. 
But it is important to recognize that the ultimate aim of the updated 
competitive strategy is nevertheless that of committed loyalists. It is the 
goal of vindicating – and by no means of modifying – Epicurus’ proprietary 
doctrinal positions. The most striking case of this, well attested in On sign-
inferences and elsewhere, is Epicurus’ much-derided thesis that the sun, far 
from being larger than the earth as the astronomers maintain, is actually 
just as small as it appears.18 As we learn from Philodemus (On sign-
inferences, IX, 18-XI, 9), Zeno of Sidon faithfully defended this thesis 
against Stoic attacks.19 And in doing so he brought to bear the full 
Epicurean armory developed in the debate we have been witnessing. 
 
 
 
                                                                          
17 In the example cited here, the Epicurean ‘swerve’ of atoms, the additional appeal 
to οὐκ ἀντιμαρτύρησις is attested at Lucretius, DRN, II, 249-250. 
18 Epicurus, Letter to Pythocles, 91, with many secondary attestations: for these, 
further bibliography, and the broader scientific context, see J. Barnes, “The Size of the Sun 
in Antiquity”, in Id., Mantissa: Essays in Ancient Philosophy IV, ed. by M. Bonelli, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2015 (first ed. in Acta Classica Universitatis Scientiarum 
Debreceniensis, 25, 1989, p. 29-41), p. 1-20. 
19 Zeno’s immediate Stoic critic here is Dionysius of Cyrene (On sign-inferences, XI, 
14-15), but there is plentiful evidence (see Barnes, “The Size of the Sun in Antiquity”) 
that Posidonius, the most mathematical as well as the most eminent Stoic of the time, was 
the prime mover of this particular critique. 
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